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• Biases associated with the selection of test statistics to detect publication bias are described.
• Problems with the failure to identify the sampling space of articles are discussed.
• Issues regarding the interpretation of significance tests in journals are presented.
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a b s t r a c t
Methodology described by Francis in ‘‘Replication, Statistical Consistency and Publication Bias’’ is
examined in the context of its application to the Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012) article. Several biases
are discovered in this analysis, including selection biases in the reporting of p-values from the Topolinski
and Sparenberg article, as well as in the criteria that were used in the selection of this article. General
concerns regarding the replicability of scientific studies based on significance tests conducted at the 5%
level of significance are also described.
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(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).eMy wife and I recently attended a viewing of the blockbuster
movie Skyfall. My wife, who is not much a James Bond fan, cleverly
pointed out at the end of the initial chase scene that there was
really no way Bond could have survived the fall from the bridge.
I was a bit dumbfounded by her comment, coming as it did after
Bond had already driven his motorcycle across the rooftops of
Istanbul, catapulted himself from a motorcycle on to the top of
a moving train, and used a backhoe to both deflect a barrage of
machine gun fire and recouple two segments of a train. Clearly,
she does not understand the concept of ‘‘willing suspension of
disbelief’’ (Coleridge, 1817).
I find myself in much the same position after being asked
to comment on Francis’s article in which a testing framework is
proposed for testing for an excess of significant findings in the
psychological literature. I simply cannot quite determine the level
of absurdity that I am expected to ignore. It is almost as if all parties
involved are pretending that p-values reported in thepsychological
literature have some well-defined meaning and that our goal is to
ferret out the few anomalies that have somehowmisrepresented a
type I error. Nothing, of course, could be farther from the truth.
Before discussing the details of the article, I think it is perhaps
worthwhile to review a fundamental truth of classical statistical
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as normally reported, p-values and significance tests provide
the consumer of these statistics absolutely no protection against
rejecting ‘‘true’’ null hypotheses at less than any specified rate
smaller than 1.0. P-values and classical significance tests only
provide the experimenter with such a protection. And they only
provide an experimenter with this protection if she behaves in
a scientifically principled way. If you do not agree, consider the
following stylized example in the realm of medical research.
Suppose that a biological pathway associated with the growth
of cancer is identified and that numerous teams of medical re-
searchers develop drugs to disrupt this pathway. Assume that
1,000 such drugs are developed and tested in 5% significance tests.
Suppose further that all tests are conducted in a scientifically valid
way – that is, only the primary outcome of each experiment is an-
alyzed, no sub-group analyses are performed, no anomalous find-
ings are discarded, etc. – and that only those drugs found to be
significant at the 5% level are reported and published.
What would the result of this activity be if it was later deter-
mined that the identified biological pathway had nothing at all to
do with the development of cancer? On average, 50 drugs would
have been identified as promising. If these drugs were subjected
to further independent testing at the 5% level of significance, on
average 2.5 of these drugs would have had their effects confirmed
in follow-up experiments. According to statistical theory, we know
that the researchers will commit, on average, a type I error in only
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reported the significant findings? It is 100%—the null hypothesis
of no treatment effect is, by construction, true for all tested drugs.
The same is true for the reports of significance for the average 2.5
drugs that would have passed the replication studies.
Note also that this stylized example does not account for the
fact that inmost scientific experiments there aremultiple outcome
variables or that researchers often perform multiple statistical
analyses of each outcome variable in order to report the most
highly significant result. Or that researchers frequently terminate
experiments prematurely when a significant test statistic is
obtainedor that observations not compatiblewith an investigator’s
hypothesis are sometimes discarded because of ‘‘errors’’ in data
collection.
One might argue that the solution to this problem is to simply
register all experiments and their statistical analysis plans prior to
their execution. This is essentially the intent of the Food and Drug
Administration’s effort to register clinical trials. Unfortunately, the
reality of scientific research in most areas of study is that there are
no comprehensive databases for preregistration of experiments.
As a consequence, it should come as no surprise that published
research findings, particularly of novel findings, often fail to
replicate in follow-up studies.
Part of the problem of non-reproducibility of scientific studies
can be attributed to the declaration of statistical significance for
experiments that have less than a 5% type I error. For z tests and
other uniformly most powerful tests, the rejection regions associ-
ated with this level of significance correspond exactly to the rejec-
tion regions of uniformly most powerful Bayesian tests (Johnson,
2013). From this correspondence, it can be shown that a p-value of
0.05 reduces the odds that the null hypothesis is true by a factor of
less than 4. To obtain evidence that increases the odds of the alter-
native hypothesis by a factor of 20, significance tests must be con-
ducted at the 0.7% level. Requiring p-values to be less than0.5% for a
claimof significancewould certainly be a step in the right direction.
Of course, even this improvement would not eliminate the
problem. In the drug example above, on average 5 drugs would
have passed initial testing at this more stringent criterion. It is for
this reason that science must proceed by replication of studies.
Once a finding has been published, it then becomes feasible for
journals to publish additional studies that both confirm and deny
the original finding. This process can, of course, be facilitated
through the report of Bayes factors, but that is the topic for another
paper.
Francis proposes to address the problem of non-replicability
of scientific studies through the implementation of a test for an
excess in significant findings. Although I applaud him for this
effort, I have concerns regarding the statistical methodology that
he employs, as well as concerns regarding his guilt in committing
sins of the very type he hopes to expose.
The type of publication bias that Francis hopes to address con-
cerns the publication of results in which p-values from several ex-
periments are all much closer to the nominal level of, say, 5% than
would be expected under usual random variation. Francis points
out that the appearance of such closely spaced p-values could re-
sult either from an investigator’s failure to report test results that
were not significant, or, more insidiously, the fabrication of data.
Following previous research along these lines (e.g., Ioannidis &
Trikalinos, 2007), he proposes a chi-squared test statistic for an ex-
cess of significant findings that is based on calculating the observed
and expected number of significant findings under the assumption
of a common (or nearly common) effect size across studies. As he
shows through extensive simulation studies, the actual type I er-
ror of the resulting test statistic falls far below its nominal level.
Francis correctly argues that the resulting test is conservative, but
the disparity between the advertised type I error rate and its actualrate raises serious questions about the veracity of the entire proce-
dure. Clearly, a test statistic that more nearly achieved its nominal
operating characteristic would be easier to interpret. It would also
provide better power in detecting the type of publication bias that
Francis targets.
Aside from the fact that the operating characteristics of Fran-
cis’s test statistic are so poor, even more serious problems are en-
countered when one attempts to apply this methodology. These
problems are perhaps easiest to understand by reviewing Francis’s
analysis of the Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012) article.
Topolinski and Sparenberg (T&S) conducted four studies to
determine whether subjects modified their responses to stimuli
according to the direction in which another object was rotated. In
their first study, T&S randomized 50 subjects into two groups. One
group turned objects in the clockwise direction while rating the
likeness of Chinese ideographs, whereas the other turned objects
in the counterclockwise direction while also rating the likeness of
ideographs. Likeness was rated on a 7 point scale. During a training
phase, both groups were shown 10 Chinese ideographs. In the test
phase, both groups were shown the same 10 ideographs, plus 10
‘‘new’’ ideographs, again while turning objects. The parameter of
interest in this experiment was the difference, between the two
groups, of the mean difference assigned by each subject to ratings
of the original and new ideographs. T&S hypothesized that the
mean difference of differences would be affected by the direction
in which subjects turned the objects.
T&S reported several statistics based on data collected in Study
1 to support their hypothesis. They begin their results section as
follows:
A 2 (Exposure: old items, new items, within) × 2 (Turning
Direction: clockwise, counterclockwise; between) analysis
of variance (ANOVA) solely yielded an interaction between
Exposure and Turning Direction, F(1, 48) = 15.93, p < .0001,
η2p = .25, and no other effects (ps < .30). Participants who
had turned the objects counterclockwise liked old stimuli
(Mcounterclockwise-old = 4.46, SD = 0.59) more than novel stimuli
(Mcounterclockwise-new = 4.10, SD = 0.57), t(24) = 3.64, p <
.001, d = 0.62, replicating the classic mere exposure effect.
In contrast, however, participants who turned the objects
clockwise liked old stimuli (Mcounterclockwise-old = 3.95, SD =
0.86) less than novel stimuli (Mcounterclockwise-new = 4.27, SD =
0.85), reversing the mere exposure effect, t(24) = 2.30, p <
.031, d = 0.36.
From this description, it is clear that T&S regard their primary
outcome variable as the difference between the difference ratings
provided by subjects who rotated the objects clockwise versus
those who turned the objects counterclockwise. The test statistic
for this difference of differences corresponds to the initial F
statistic for the interaction term in the ANOVA, F(1, 48) = 15.93.
The corresponding t statistic is t(48) = 3.99, is much larger
than either of the t statistics reported in the secondary analyses
(3.64 and 2.30). That is, the interaction, and not the simple main
effects, is the primary test statistic. It must be emphasized that
both t-statistics that Francis includes in his analysis represent
tests of whether a difference between the original and novel
ideograph ratings under the same experimental condition (either
clockwise or counterclockwise rotation) was equal to 0. However,
the appropriate analysis for this experiment is to test whether the
difference between these differences is 0. Because the differences
have opposite signs, the appropriate analysis results in a much
larger estimate of the experiment’s effect size and statistical
power. Note also that there is only one (not two) significant finding
in this study.
Francis’s error in this example signals an important practical
problem associated with implementing tests for an excess of
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for every data set reported, and in many cases it is not clear which
analysis and test statistics should be selected to test for an excess
of significant findings. In this case the F statistic is clearly correct,
but inmany studies the choice of test statistic is not nearly so clear.
In Study 2 of T&S, subjectswere again randomized to turn an ob-
ject in one of two directions, but in this experiment subjects com-
pleted an experiential openness survey. T&S report that the mean
response to survey items representing ‘‘openness’’ for subjectswho
turned the object counterclockwise was higher than those who
turned the object counterclockwise, with t(58) = 2.21 and p =
.031. A somewhat more significant p-value is obtained through an
analysis that controlled for mood and arousal (F(1, 56) = 6.54,
p = 0.013), but this result does not appear to represent the analy-
sis that was planned prior to the experiment. Interestingly, T&S re-
port that no significant finding is discovered for mood and arousal
ratings, but that no significant finding was anticipated for these at-
tributes. This explanation might represent ‘‘HARKing,’’ but it does
suggest that T&S have not intentionally placed unfavorable out-
comes in a ‘‘file drawer’’.
Errors similar to Study 1 are made in the interpretation of
results fromStudy3,which essentially replicates Study 1 and Study
2, except that subjects in Study 3 watched a rotating object rather
than actually rotating an object themselves, and the dependent
variables of both Study 1 and 2weremeasured in counterbalanced
order. The F statistic in Study 3 that is similar to the F statistic
used in Study 1 is F(1, 79) = 9.54, with p = .003. The t statistic
corresponding to Study 2 is t(79) = 2.04 and p < .044. Francis
decides to base his analysis of an excess of statistical findings on
the weaker t statistic and ignores the stronger result based on
the F statistic, since, as he puts it, ‘‘these additional tests can only
decrease the power of the overall findings (the rules of probability
dictate that multiple outcomes in a set cannot be more probable
than a single outcome from that set)’’.
Study 4 reports the outcome from only a single test, which,
as Francis reports, produced a t statistic of t(48) = 2.04 and
p = .047.
What is the impact of Francis’ selection of test statistics on tests
for excess significant findings? The power associated with the F
statistic in Study 1 is approximately 0.97 when calculated using
methods similar to those proposed for the other statistics included
in the study. Francis reports the power of Studies 2 and 4 to be
0.573 and .503, respectively. The power of the second finding in
Study 3 is reported as .514, and the power of the first part of Study
3 is approximately 0.86. According to the proposed test statistic
and Eq. (3), the probability of seeing 5 significant findings out of
5 is thus 0.97 × .573 × .86 × .513 × .503 = .12, which is
not significant according to the criterion described in the article.
It should be noted that this calculation does not account for the
uncertainty in the power values, or the fact that the use of a pooled
(averaged) power value would have led to an even less significant
result. The errors made by Francis in interpreting the results of the
T&S article are, unfortunately, propagated into his post-hoc testanalysis, invalidating that analysis as well (the post-hoc testing
paradigm itself seems even more ad hoc; it relies on numerous
unverified and untestable assumptions that, for reasons of time
and space constraints, are not discussed further here).
Several lessons are apparent from the preceding discussion.
As mentioned above, it is often difficult to determine which test
statistics should be used to test for an excess of statistical findings.
Most quantitative research articles report multiple tests based
on the same data. The resulting test statistics are generally not
independent, which complicates joint modeling of their values.
And, as demonstrated above, the choice of test statistics to use
in a test for excess significant findings can have a dramatic
effect on the conclusions of the test. In addition, statistical power
typically varies substantially across distinct experiments. Although
Francis combined results within the T&S studies so that the power
associated with each study ranged between 0.503 and 0.573, the
actual powers of the individual experiments reported by T&S
appear to have ranged from about 0.5 to 0.97. Heterogeneous
power values further complicate the calculation and interpretation
of the test statistic in Eq. (1), as Francis himself notes. Similarly, the
assumption that standardized effect sizes are homogeneous across
experiments should be regarded with caution. In the T&S article,
for example, there does not seem to be any rationale to justify
an assumption that the standardized effect size of rotation on
object likeness in Study 1 should be the same as the standardized
effect size of rotation on the mean response to survey items, as
reported in Study 2. In general, different experiments measure
different outcomes under different conditions, so it will seldom be
the case that a standardized effect size of a common treatment is
the same across experiments. It therefore seems that tests of the
type proposed by Francis are unlikely to find broad application in
practical settings.
As serious as these problems are, I think a much more serious
deficiency of Francis’ program involves exactly the type of publica-
tion bias that Francis is attempting to detect. As the drug example
above demonstrates, it is impossible to evaluate the type I error as-
sociated with Francis’ report of excess significant findings because
there is no way to evaluate his sampling frame. Howmany articles
did Francis examine before finding four similarly-valued t statis-
tics in the T&S paper? And how many t statistics did he examine
in each of those papers? Despite his protestations to the contrary,
his methodology is subject to exactly the same type of publication
bias that he attempts to expose.
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